Belisarius: Justinian’s 'Tip of the Spear' in the Restoration of the Western Roman Empire
- Dana Rovang
- Aug 21
- 15 min read
Updated: Sep 11
Part I: Origins, The Persian Wars, and the Nika Riots
Origins: Justinian and Belisarius
The sixth century CE found the Eastern Roman Empire — or Byzantium, as it came to be known — at a crossroads. The empire’s political volatility in the interior, combined with ever rising transnational threats, had already set in motion forces that threatened its coherence and existence.
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The rise of Justinian the First (or Justinian the Great) signified the start of a new era, when a “Dreamer emperor” accomplished the restoration of the Western Roman Empire (even briefly), which had fallen to the Goths in 410 CE despite the odds and having had to face multiple internal and external opponents.
Justinian’s restored empire could not have been accomplished without Belisarius, one of the greatest generals of the Middle Ages and according to many historians, one of the greatest military figures of all time. Belisarius came to act as the extension of Justinian’s will, word, might and vision, although their relationship was plagued by the emperor’s envy and mistrust, fueled by Empress Theodora’s political machinations.
Belisarius, according to some sources, was born in the town of Germanicia, modern day Sapareva Banya, in southwestern Bulgaria, then Thrace. Other sources, though, report that he was born in Illyria, as was Justinian. Although the exact year of his birth is not known, he was most probably born around 505 CE. His lineage is not known either, but judging from Procopius, who mentions the humble origins of Justinian, Theodora and Belisarius’s wife, Antonina, he doesn’t mention Belisarius having similar origins, which might hint at a more upper-class upbringing, or Procopius was simply not aware. The early years of his military career are similarly obscured, but according to limited information, he was a member of Justinian’s bodyguard. As with other career military men in Byzantium, he would have likely joined between the ages of 16 to 18. By the age of 25 — just like Hannibal and Napoleon — he was already a General; remarkable as the typical age of Generals in Byzantium was 35. It is unknown, as well, whether his rapid advancement in Byzantine ranks was due to any aristocratic roots, his rare military skills, or a combination of both.
Belisarius was highly regarded for his virtues at a time when men of his stature would not hesitate to employ any means necessary in order to gain rank, societal status and wealth. Procopius in his “Secret History” does not hesitate to scorch the Justinian-Theodora-Antonina triad for what he deemed immoral and scheming behavior. However, his only criticism for Belisarius was that he was manipulated by Antonina, who Procopius thought was a devious and manipulative woman.
Belisarius was often caught in the middle of this triangle, the consequences of which threatened the empire’s stability and Justinian’s dream of restoring the Western Roman Empire. Fortunately, though, luck was on his side, and it was this very luck, during Byzantium’s early expansionist moves that “forgave” these missteps, and set the foundations for the consolidation of the thousand-year empire.
The Persian Wars: Foundational Foe
Undoubtedly, amongst the empire’s many enemies, the most menacing threat was the Sassanian, or Persian, Empire. Worthy successor of both the Achaemenid dynasty (the dissolution of which was caused by the campaign of Alexander the Great in 330 BCE) and the Parthians. The Sassanid Persians featured a combination of the deadliest weapons, namely the light mounted archers and the ultra-heavy war horse “Cataphracts”.
Byzantium’s armed forces were also modernized, even before Justinian’s rule, to face contemporary threats. These threats had compelled the transition from a mighty infantry, like that of Rome, to a mobile force, ready to be deployed anywhere, at any time. Indeed, it was this modernization process that saw the advent of the mighty “Biscuit eaters”, (the “Bucelarii,” named after their favorite biscuit), which formed the core of the elite “Comitati” bodyguards. The armed forces of the empire also included mounted archers and mercenary Hunnic horse archers, their allegiance, though, was not always guaranteed.
The Battle of Dara against the Persians was Belisarius’s first display of his strategic genius. In 530 AD, a series of events brought the Sassanid Persians outside the fort of Dara, where Belisarius was stationed. Leading an army of 25,000 men against Persia’s 50,000, Belisarius demonstrated superior tactical skills, including making the most of openings left by his opponent, and wielding his cavalry with deadly precision.
Belisarius’s star was on the rise; yet his military genius was clouded by shortcomings and personal plagues. At the Battle of Callinicum against the Sassanid Persians a year later (531 CE), Belisarius had the numerical advantage, but still lost the battle. This was largely due to his choice of observing from the ground, thus minimizing his visibility and perspective. Moreover, even though he had initially chosen to wait until after Easter was celebrated (which would have given him a day to observe the battlefield in advance), he yielded to his soldiers’ enthusiasm and insistence on fighting as soon as possible. Belisarius was noble and loyal to a fault, but he also had a soft spot for his troops. This soft spot had cost him the Battle of Callinicum and his title of “Magister militum per Orientem” (Supreme Commander of the East). It would later cost him a lot more.
The losses at Callinicum were so heavy that both sides were reluctant to keep fighting. The Sassanid Persians and Byzantines signed a peace treaty — The Treaty of Eternal, or Perpetual, Peace — that would last just eight years. This concluded what is known as the “Iberian War” (526-532 CE).
The Nika Riot
Immediately after this loss, the Byzantine Emperor Justinian also had trouble at home, and Belisarius would have a second chance to prove his worth by putting down the Nika riot in 532 CE. This riot is largely considered to be the most brutal quelling of civic unrest in history, wherein the first Hagia Sophia in Constantinople was also destroyed. (Justinian would rebuild it, constructing the now legendary landmark).
First, a note on Byzantine politics: before Justinian came to the throne, the emperor’s reign was not absolute. Instead, the emperor had to consider numerous constituents, including the army, the political aristocracy, the people of Constantinople, and the large agricultural masses of the provinces. In the core of this decision making “matrix” stood the Charioteers Sports clubs, who carried out chariot races in the Hippodromes of the empire’s major cities of Constantinople, Alexandria and Antioch. In the 6th Century CE, there were two major sports clubs, the Blues and the Greens. These factions had an oversized influence on the empire’s politics, so much so that the Hippodrome in Constantinople was considered the “political barometer” of the empire.
On the eve of the Nika Riot in 532, Justinian had just finished implementing several major fiscal reforms that consolidated his power. These reforms included reducing government spending and imposing tariffs on trade. At the same time, he cut the salaries of army members and political employees. The people were on the verge of open rebellion, as a result. And a common place to express their discontent was at the chariot races in the Hippodrome.
![Constantinople, The Hippodrome, ca. 1450. (Source: Onofrio Panvinio, De ludis circensibus, libri II [Venice, 1600], 60-61; plate engraved by Étienne Dupérac before 1568)](https://static.wixstatic.com/media/260eac_830ecf8f3e694f06a323dcd28fc10f71~mv2.png/v1/fill/w_980,h_665,al_c,q_90,usm_0.66_1.00_0.01,enc_avif,quality_auto/260eac_830ecf8f3e694f06a323dcd28fc10f71~mv2.png)
The inciting factor for these riots was a smaller, post-race skirmish the week before between the factions — or demes — of the Blues (Veneti) and the Greens (Prasani). This brawl resulted in the murder of several people, and several people were arrested. The perpetrators were set for execution, but two of the prisoners — a Blue and a Green — escaped when the gallows collapsed. They took refuge in a nearby church, and subsequently became the focus for all of the local anti-Justinian sentiment.
The Blues and Greens clubs put aside their quarrels and joined forces. Indeed, the two demes united, chanting together “Nika,” meaning “win” or “victory.” This new united group spearheaded an all-out rebellion and pushed for the election of a new emperor, Hypatius, who was the nephew of the former emperor Anastasius. Justinian panicked and was ready to leave the capital and abdicate, but his wife, Empress Theodora, counseled him against it with an impassioned speech, giving ample space to Belisarius to quench the riot in blood.
While the rioters were centralized in the Hippodrome, Belisarius and another general, Mundus, took up arms on opposite sides of the crowd. Then, Narses, a eunuch and a major military figure who would be critical in Justinian’s campaign in Italy, had the task of blocking all the building’s exits. The crowd was infiltrated by Justinian’s spies, who started cheering in favor of the emperor, thus driving the rioters to fight against each other. Belisarius and Mundus took advantage of the situation, entered the Hippodrome and began an intervention, which turned into a bloodbath. Contemporaneous sources estimate that between 30,000 - 35,000 people were killed and large parts of Constantinople burned to the ground.
The Nika riots solidified Justinian’s absolute hegemony, and the sports clubs would never again meddle in the empire’s politics. The riots also underlined once again Belisarius’ charisma and his loyalty to Justinian. He was soon tasked with taking up the campaigns against the Vandals in North Africa and the Ostrogoths in Italy.
Part II: Of Vandals and Ostrogoths
The Vandalic Wars
The political circumstances in Northern Africa were fluid, and Justinian was willing to take advantage. In 530, Gelimar usurped his cousin, Hilderic, for the Vandal crown. The Vandal territory was centralized on the other side of the Mediterranean, in the area of Tunisia today, but this marauding group controlled large swaths of the Mediterranean territories, and was responsible for another sack of Rome in 455 CE, following the Visigoth decimation of the city in 410 CE. The rule of the usurper Vandal king, Gelimer, had left many of his people discontent. Additionally, Hilderic had been close to Justinian, and his faction turned to Justinian asking for an intervention to topple Gelimar, restoring Hilderic to the throne.
Justinian capitalized on the grim political reality and chose Belisarius to command the Byzantine expeditionary force in Africa. Despite Belisarius’s poor performance in Callinicum, he was chosen because of his loyalty, his successful put-down of the Nika riots, and his extraordinary strategic skill, shown in the battle of Dara. The Byzantine fleet set sail from Constantinople in June 533 CE, carrying roughly 20,000 men with Belisarius as the commander in chief. The historian Procopius went with Belisarius, giving us a first hand account of the Belisarius’s operation. (Procopius, History of the Vandalic Wars)
Procopius narrated in detail the three month journey across the Mediterranean, and he described a few key events that reveal to us Belisarius’s character. In one, Belisarius was worried the fleet would split apart while crossing as ships were apt to drift apart in windy conditions, and knowing this, he created red banners and ordered lamps to be hung at night on the lead ships, keeping his fleet intact. In another story, Belisarius discovered that his soldiers plundered the nearby farms after they landed, and was incensed. He punished the perpetrators and gave an impassioned speech to his troops, lamenting that they had done tremendous damage to the morale of those living nearby (the “Libyans”), making his job harder:
Now, therefore, the war will be between you and both Vandals and Libyans, and I, at least, say further that it will be against God himself, whose aid no one who does wrong can invoke. But do you cease trespassing wantonly upon the possessions of others, and reject a gain which is full of dangers. For this is that time in which above all others moderation is able to save, but lawlessness leads to death. For if you give heed to these things, you will find God propitious, the Libyan people well-disposed, and the race of the Vandals open to your attack." (Procopius, Vandals, XVI)
It is estimated that the Vandal forces under Gelimer were between 10,000-15,000 strong, to Belisarius’s roughly 20,000. Belisarius finally faced Gelimer and his nephew Gibamundus and brother, Ammatus on September 13, 533. Gelimer had devised a three pronged siege, but Belisarius exhibited extraordinary courage by attacking Gelimer’s high ground position and forcing him to flee. Gibamundus and Ammatus were killed in the fighting. Procopius thought it possible that the enemy’s fear of the Roman army caused the Vandal lines to break and scatter, of which Belisarius took advantage, marching on to Carthage.
The Battle of Ad Decimum in 533 CE. On the left is how Gelimer planned, and on the right is how he was thwarted by Belisarius and his forces, ending in a rout.
When they arrived the next evening, Procopius tells us that the gates of Carthage were open, but fearing a trick, Belisarius encamped outside. Meanwhile, the fleet arrived at the Carthage port, and with the added troops, Belisarius marched into Carthage and occupied it without resistance on September 15, 533 CE.
After his defeat, Gelimer went into hiding, but was not defeated. He paid local farmers to gain their favor, and sent envoys to other territories, including the Visigoths in Spain and the Huns.
Gelimer made his next move in December of 533, calling together a number of different factions to counter the Roman soldiers entrenched in Carthage. However, neither side made much ground, until Belisarius took his infantry in the late afternoon of the day and made for Gelimer’s camp. Belisarius had seen that the Vandal army’s flanks were manned by soldiers, who had already witnessed his astonishing victory at Ad Decimum and were therefore petrified, thus he attacked the center. Procopius tells us that Gelimer leapt onto his horse and fled, and the Vandal line collapsed. Gelimer would be captured after a chase and lengthy blockage, but eventually surrendered and was given an estate in Galatia. Belisarius was given the title of consul ordinarus for the year 535.
The campaign had been won and North Africa, Sardinia, Corsica and the Balearic Islands came under Byzantine rule. Justinian, noting the military power of Belisarius and the loyalty of his troops, decided to test Belisarius in case the Byzantine general decided to found a new empire in North Africa. To this, Justinian summoned Belisarius to Constantinople. Justinian thought that if Belisarius failed to return back to the capital, it would signify that the general was indeed planning to supplant Justinian. Belisarius did return, and for the time being, the relationship between the Byzantine emperor and his most trusted General was normalized, but not for long.
The Gothic Wars: how palace intrigue shaped reunification
Justinian was not satisfied with the conquest of the North African territories, and reclamation of the former Roman territory of Carthage. Indeed, he soon set his sights on reclaiming Rome itself and reuniting the Roman territories as a restored empire.
As is commonly known, over 100 years prior to Belisarius’s North Africa campaigns, the Germanic Visigoth tribe sacked Rome in 410 CE under King Alaric. The fifth-century saw a rolling series of uprisings and civil wars in and around Rome and Italy between rival factions, in particular the Visigoths and the Ostrogoths. By mid-century, the Kingdom of Italy was consolidated under the Ostrogothic ruler, Theodoric the Great (475-526). Theodoric was also named “regent of the Visigoths,” (r. 511-526) thereby uniting the Gothic tribes. After Theodoric died in 526, the region fell back into infighting and instability. Justinian took note, and after Belisarius returned from his victories in North Africa with his loyalty assured.
Justinian’s Gothic campaign in Italy was ripe with plots, intrigues and insubordination, and it is a case where political machinations had as much to do with Belisarius’s success or failure than his battlefield victories. While the specifics of Belisarius’s eventual conquest of Rome and “restoration” of the Roman Empire in the West are also fraught with attack-and-parry brilliance, it pales in comparison to the palace intrigues that he dealt with while carrying out Justinian’s mandate to reunify of the Empire.
In 535, Belisarius launched his campaign to recapture Rome, and managed to sweep through much of Sicily and Italy almost unopposed. One area of resistance came from Panormus (modern Palermo) and Naples, which were conquered eventually along with Rome by the Byzantine expeditionary force during a prolonged siege from 537-538 CE.
While Rome was an important symbolic conquest, the Gothic capital of Ravenna was yet to be taken. The Siege of Ravenna took place from late 539-540 CE, and saw Belisarius working with his commanders Magnus and Vitalius to orchestrate its fall. According to Procopius, Belisarius ordered Magnus and Vitalius to be stationed with troops on either side of the river Po, which Ravenna used to resupply their grain stores. In a rare fluke, the water level of the river had fallen to a record low, and this allowed Belisarius to take the grain stores, which he distributed among his troops. Belisarius had also blockaded Ravenna’s Adriatic Sea port, and the city began to suffer the effects of lack of resources.
Eventually, the Goths sent envoys to Belisarius to negotiate, even offering him the opportunity to rule, saying, “We therefore propose, if you are willing, to share with you the rule of all Italy, and we shall administer the land in whatever manner seems best. And for thee and the Goths the natural course to follow is that one which is destined to redound to your advantage." As we know of him and his virtues, Belisarius declined repeated offers to rule as king, saying he would never take the title as long as Justinian was alive. Negotiations continued until Ravenna came under the control of the Byzantine forces later in the year.
In the meantime, Justinian’s obsessions led him to send Narses (who had aided in the Nika Riots) to keep tabs on Belisarius, in case the idea of crowning himself “emperor” of the Western Roman Empire crossed his mind. As we know, opposing Justinian was the last thing worrying Belisarius; yet, the machinations, insubordination, and jealousy among some of his commanders consumed the Byzantine expeditionary force. Even Procopius, who lionized Belisarius and glossed over many errors of judgement, had difficulty justifying some of Belisarius’s decisions when it came to those closest to him.
In 542 CE, Justinian fell ill following an outbreak of bubonic plague and the Empress Theodora was left to rule as she pleased. Not surprisingly, she isolated Belisarius by conducting a psychological war with “Comrade-in-machination”, Antonina, Belisarius’s wife. Most definitely, Antonina was Belisarius’s “Kryptonite” so much so that historians, like Procopius, put the blame on her each time Belisarius’s perception was clouded in the battlefield, like Callinicum for example. Indeed, Antonina was unrelenting and ruthless. Procopius tells us in his “Secret History” that she was ruled by her passion for Belisarius’s adopted son, Theodosius, which dictated a myriad of questionable and horrific actions that reverberated across the Empire.
Only when his wife’s lover died of dysentery, did Belisarius actually recuperate from his depression and passivity. Justinian, who had survived the plague, sent him to the east, where the General mounted a disinformation campaign against the Persians, convincing them that the Byzantines possessed a superior force, and eventually turning the Persians away as a result.
Shortly after this, in 544, he returned to Italy, but the Byzantine expeditionary force was now extremely depleted, and Justinian even went so far as to force Belisarius to pay for the campaign’s expenses. And yet, Belisarius scored several victories even with the limited troops at his disposal. Narses would later capitalize on those strategic wins when he assumed the leadership of the campaign, but by then he was reinforced with adequate forces and resources. From what we are told, Belisarius was repeatedly set up to fail by Justinian and the palace manipulators, but he still managed to achieve incredible wins, despite the odds.
In his final battle, the Battle of Melantias, Belisarius was again called to save the Byzantine Empire, Justinian, and Constantinople. In 559 CE, a nomadic tribe called the Kutrigurs reached the Byzantine Capital’s gates, threatening Constantinople not unlike the Visigoths and the sack of Rome. This group hailing from the Steppes had far superior numbers, but Belisarius had superior strategy, pulling off a decisive win and sending the Kutrigurs back. And yet, two years after Belisarius’s flawless victory, he was accused of plotting to overthrow Justinian once again. This back-and-forth, push-pull of jealousy and domination continued until Belisarius’s death on 13 March 565 CE, just eight months before the emperor, whom he honored with all his heart and everlasting loyalty and he received hostility and suspicions in return.
Summary
Belisarius was undoubtedly a military mastermind, but the virtues that made him a successful, respectful, and prudent general were also used against him in palace machinations. His emperor, his wife, the empress, and his subordinates all reached out for that soft spot, to manipulate him and obscure the talents and the heights he was destined to reach. The plots and machinations against him would become embedded in the culture of Byzantium, and the backstabbings and schemes became the trademark “currency” of the empire. It could be argued that this same mentality was passed on to the Slavic culture and thus Byzantium’s influence was “tattooed” on Russian domestic affairs. Seen, for example, in the relationships between Mikhail Kutuzov and Tsar Alexander all the way to Georgy Zhukov and Stalin, this brand of court maneuvering between general and rule shows up again and again, where great figures fade to obscurity and opportunists manipulate the regime’s mechanisms.
Alexandros Boufesis has an Msc in International Security Studies (London Metropolitan University) and a PgC in Counter-Terrorism (St Andrews). Alexandros has worked for many years as a Freelance article writer and an investigative journalist covering topics on military history, geopolitics and defense.
Primary Materials
Procopius, Henry Bronson Dewing (Translator) (2023): The History of the Wars: Complete Works: The Persian War, The Vandalic War & the Gothic War
Procopius, Peter Sarris (Ed.), G. A. Williamson (Translator) (2007):The Secret History
Secondary Sources and further reading
J.Haldon (2008): The Byzantine Wars
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